Which proposal will you recommend if the government cares both efficiency and equal share of economic rent?

Please write down ONE number (1, 2, or 3) only and no any other sign.

Proposal 3: limits Angela’s working hours to 10 hours and sets the minimum pay to 4.5 bushels.

Which point on the diagram represents the new outcome? Please write down ONE letter only and no any other sign.

Proposal 1: limits Angela’s working hours to 4 hours.

Which point on the diagram represents the new outcome? Please write down ONE letter only and no any other sign.

Bruno is a landowner and Angela is a farmer who pays a share of her grain output to Bruno for the use of the land. Angela and Bruno’s feasible frontier is downward sloping and concave, while Angela’s reservation indifference curve is downward sloping and convex (as shown in the figure). If Bruno has all the bargaining power, read the following statements and select the correct one.

Bruno is a landowner and Angela is a farmer who pays a share of her grain output to Bruno for the use of the land. The figure shows Angela and Bruno’s feasible frontier, and Angela’s reservation indifference curve. If Angela does not work, she receives a ration of 2.5 bushels from the government. Which one of the following statements is correct?

Bruno is a landowner and Angela is a farmer who pays a share of her grain output to Bruno for the use of the land. The figure shows Angela and Bruno’s feasible frontier and Angela’s reservation indifference curve. F is above her reservation indifference curve, and Angela’s preferences are quasi-linear. Based on this information, read the following statements and select the correct one.

What is/are the Pareto-Efficient Nash Equilibria? 

Type in the Nash Equilibrium in the format of (Share/Fight, Share/Fight). If there are none, type NA.

Fill in the blanks: if country B plays ‘share’, country A’s best response will be to ____, and if country B plays ‘fight’, country A’s best response will be to . Provide the answers separated by a semi-colon, i.e. FirstAnswer;SecondAnswer.

What is/are the Nash Equilibria? 

Type in the Nash Equilibrium in the format of (Share/Fight, Share/Fight). If there are none, type NA.