Maria’s employment rent if she can get another job with the same wage rate after 44 weeks of being unemployed is more than $6,160.

The employment rent per hour is $3.

Maria’s employment rent if she can only get a job at the same wage rate after 44 weeks of being unemployed is less than $7,700.

The employment rent will fall unless the firm raises the wage.

A worker’s effort increases because the employment rent increases.

Effort decreases because the disutility of effort decreases.

It equals the wage you receive in your employment.

Higher employment rents make workers less likely to quit their job.

They are the costs you have to pay for your employment.

Higher employment rents make workers more likely to quit their job.

The no-shirking wage will be higher than the

worker’s productivity.

Employers must set wages equal to workers’

reservation wages to cover the cost of work effort.

The employer has to choose the highest wage that

gives an employee an incentive to work hard.

Paying above the worker’s reservation wage results

in employment rent.

It equals the wage you

receive in your employment.

Employers can use high employment rents to exert

power over employees.

They are the costs you have to pay for your

employment.

Higher employment rents make workers more likely to

quit their job.

Bruce is better off not working, irrespective of the actions of the other members.

The dominant strategy equilibrium of this public goods game is when no one works.

Bruce’s net income when all three members work is £80.

The socially optimal outcome (one with the highest total net income) is when all work.

An allocation can be neither Pareto efficient nor dominated.

An allocation is Pareto efficient if it is impossible to make any individual better off without making someone else worse off.

An allocation can be both Pareto efficient and dominated at the same time.

Pareto efficiency is achieved if the benefit of allocation is higher than the cost of allocation.

Taxes and benefits.

“Buy-now-pay-later” deals.

Theft of property.

Birthday presents.

If there is a reduction of more than 25 million dollars in the cost for the country to take measures to reduce emissions due to technological advancements, the US and China will reach the outcome that is best for both.

If the benefit from reducing emissions increases by more than 20 million dollars for both countries as long as at least one country chooses to restrict, (restrict, restrict) is a Nash equilibrium.

The Nash equilibrium results in the highest possible payoffs for both players.

If China chooses BAU, US will also choose BAU.