The brothers are not equally prepared to kill, so they are not equally reprehensible.

The brothers are equally prepared to kill, but they are not equally reprehensible.

The brothers are equally reprehensible, but this is a judgment about persons rather than actions.

None of the above.

Whether killing is worse than letting die depends on the motive.

Whether killing is worse than letting die depends on someone's level of preparedness to kill.

Killing is not necessarily worse than letting die.

All of the above.

A stringent right is violated only in the Large Man case.

A stringent right is violated only in the bystander at the switch case.

A stringent right is violated in both cases, but in the Large Man case, the means by which the threat was diverted also involves the violation of a stringent right.

None of the above.

The bystander, like the trolley driver, has the choice between killing one and killing five.

The bystander, like the surgeon, has the choice between killing one and letting five die.

The bystander, like the trolley driver, has the choice between killing five and letting one die.

None of the above.

Should the trolley driver turn into the one man or stay on course and kill the five?

What should the trolley driver do, given what the surgeon should do?

Why

is it permissible for the trolley driver to turn into the one man,

given that it is impermissible for the surgeon to kill the one patient

to save five others?

All of the above.