Moving from F to any point on line CD is Pareto-improving.

Depending on the slope of the feasible frontier, both Bruno and Angela can be better off at F than at D.

F is not Pareto efficient as the marginal rate of substitution does not equal the marginal rate of transformation at this point.

The relative bargaining power of Bruno and Angela determines the number of hours worked along the Pareto efficiency curve.

When the MRT of work hours into grain output is greater than the MRS of work hours into subsistence requirements, then Bruno should decrease Angela’s free time.

When the MRT of work hours into grain output is lower than the MRS of work hours into subsistence requirements, then Angela’s allocation of grain should be increased.

Angela’s most preferred option is where the MRT equates her MRS.

The marginal rate of transformation (MRT) of work hours into grain output is the slope of Angela’s reservation indifference curve, while the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of work hours into subsistence requirements is the slope of the feasible frontier.

Peter has two apples and John has two oranges.

Peter has one apple and two oranges and John has one apple.

Peter has two oranges and John has two apples.

Peter has one orange and John has one orange and two apples.

In a dictator game, the Proposer has all the bargaining power.

In an ultimatum game, the Proposer has all of the bargaining power.

In an ultimatum game, increasing the number of Responders reduces the Proposer’s bargaining power.

In a dictator game, increasing the number of Responders reduces the Proposer’s bargaining power.

The new reservation indifference curve is shifted higher.

The new reservation indifference curve is the same.

The new reservation indifference curve is steeper and goes through Z.

The new reservation indifference curve is shallower.