Hoarding behavior – both by households and by companies.

Higher investment of the state-owned companies, especially into R&D activities.

Rise in corruption and corruption-like activities.

Emergence of black markets with significantly higher prices.

Many of the original claims on how much the new owners underpaid were significantly exaggerated; they did not take into account the significant risk premia (esp. for external participants).

Treisman confirms that the transfer of important companies to the hands of oligarchs was the biggest problem of this form of privatization.

Treisman shows that the "sale" of companies to oligarchs was not necessarily the biggest problem; he attempts to draw attention to the other type of results, the role of incumbent Soviet-era managers.

Treisman demonstrates that the Loans for Shares program had a comparable effect on companies' performance and governance as Russian voucher privatization.

It was the first attempt at partial privatization in the USSR. It was started during Gorbachev’s 1980s “Perestroika” reforms.

The program was very similar to the Czech voucher privatization and turned a significant proportion of Russian population into shareholders in mid-1990s.

A special program in which shares were used as a collateral for loans. As the loans were not repaid by the state, the companies were effectively privatized.

This program is by many (including the public) described as one of the key policies which created the wealth of Russian oligarchs.

Share of global population living in a similar system is quite high and it is increasing.

It seems that especially authoritarian governments see the system as an opportunity to stabilize or reinforce their control. The system has been characteristic for an increasing number of countries.

State capitalism is extremely rare, only 1 country (DPRK) or at most 2 countries (DPRK and Cuba) would fit the definition of the system rather well.

The system is just a theoretical construct proposed by Marx, it was never fully implemented.

No, there are still only SOEs and TVEs in China.

Yes, China did privatize - especially between mid-90s and mid-2000s - and their privatization was actually the biggest in the world (as far as the number of privatized companies was concerned).

When China privatized its companies, they mostly ended in the hands of foreign owners.

When China privatized its companies, most of the companies were privatized via a "loans for shares" program.

The ratchet effect explains the resilience of economic elites, specifically the fact that many high-ranking decisionmakers (deputy managers) from pre-transition period remained in influential positions.

The ratchet effect describes situations in which managers prefer not to use up all opportunities for increasing output (and exceeding the original plan) as they are risk-averse and prefer to have reserve capacities for future plans. 

It was an effect typical for new owners of privatized companies right after voucher privatization, it was a strategy which helped the lucky few of them the majority control over privatized enterprises.

The ratchet effect describes situations in which managers volunteer to produce significantly more than they were supposed to produce and thus make plans harder to achieve.

Hungary

Belarus

Czechoslovakia

DPRK (North Korea)

Economists quite like auctions: they are transparent and do not require the seller to have a too clear idea about the value of the asset on sale.

Simple auctions were never used in privatizations (not even for less important types of assets).

Compared to other methods of sale, it is much easier to cheat in auctions (i.e. auctions are much easier to manipulate).

The biggest advantage (and also the biggest disadvantage) of auctions is the presence of a single criterion which determines who wins.

This form of privatization was expected to bring new resources to the company (new know-how, access to foreign service and distribution networks, better access to financing).

This method can provide better continuity and reduce the risks of significant shocks in the governance of the company.

This method can reduce the risks of so-called wild or unofficial privatizations.

The governments were worried about immigration which typically follows the sale of companies to foreign hands.

The presence of phenomena such as Blat or Guanxi can reduce the efficiency of allocation: we prefer people from our "network" over strangers. 

The presence of phenomena such as Blat or Guanxi can significantly improve the quality of economic policies: policy-makers are much better informed about the real world and they are much less likely to be biased in their decisions (or let themselves be influenced by factors such as nepotism).

Guanxi is typically used to describe interpersonal networks emerging in China, Blat describes/described a similar phenomenon in the Soviet Union/Russia.

“Blat” was used to describe the situation in the USA during late 19th century (the "Robber Barrons' Period).